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Europe's challenges in a globalised world

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INTEGRATION OF PERSONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
AND EU CITIZENSHIP

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SESSION 2: INTEGRATION OF PERSONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND
EU CITIZENSHIP

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1. The European Union as a Social System: What has been accomplished and what remains

During the past fifty years the European Union has gone a long way, even though some would like to have gone even further. It is possible to look at the EU as a social ecosystem, and as such as different from other ecosystems. This is a result of the fact that human populations, contrary to other plant or animal populations, do not adapt genetically to their environment, but they adapt through culture, which in turn can be divided into the material culture (technology) and the non-material culture (social organization). This is not the place to go into a detailed explanation of this theoretical model, but it suffices to say that social organization includes all forms of institutions created by Humanity (from the family to supranational organizations such as the European Union itself), as well as belief and value systems, and that all elements of culture, material or non-material, are instrumental responses adopted by human populations, rightly or wrongly, in their attempt to achieve better adaptation to their environment, that is, in their attempt to achieve the best possible conditions for survival. The four elements of the ecosystem interact with each other, so that change in one of them produces change in the other three. Equilibrium is consequently always unstable, because some changes are always taking place. The important thing to underline is that technology has been the major source of change, because through improvements in communication and transportation it has reduced distance facilitating accesibility, which in turn has meant a continuous enlargement of the environment, so that at present it may be said that the whole planet constitutes our environment, since we have access to resources from any corner of our little world. Seen from this perspective, the European Union is just part of a long standing process from the small self-sufficient and authartic communities of the past to the Greek “polis”, to the garrison city-state of medieval times, to the national state and now to supra-national organizations such as the European Union.

For heuristic purposes social organization may be divided at least in four large sub-systems: economic, cultural, social and political. They are all interrelated, and the common denominator for all four of them is increasing interdependence.

With respect to the economic sub-system, the EU has made a great progress in achieving a common economic market, though not yet complete. This has been possible because of increasing interdependence among the member states in matters that have to do with economic resources, and interdependence in that realm has conditioned, and is conditioning, interdependence in other realms. The acceptance of a common currency, and the elimination of internal borders has facilitated free or almost free circulation, though circulation has been easier for capitals, with some more restrictions for products and services (there remain protectionist attitudes on the part of populations, and protectionist national measures disguised in a more or less direct manner), and with more restrictions for persons (i.e., restrictions to free population flows from some of the new member states to the older member states). But it is true that there has been great economic convergence, especially for the previous 15 member states, and citizens admit there has been largely more benefits than damages for their national economy, and even for their personal economy.

Regarding the cultural system, the EU has contributed to make citizens in different countries to forget past rivalries in spite of such long histories of confrontations, but it is true that there remain some cultural differences that constitute obstacles to greater integration of persons within the EU, and one of them is language, though that obstacle is being overcome through the use of some language as *lingua franca*. Contrary to what was true centuries ago, religion is not a major cleavage among Europeans, so that when European countries are classified on the basis of their major religion (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox) differences in attitudes and values are contingent more on other system properties than on their major religion. This is probably the reason why the growth of populations who have other religions, and more specifically Muslim religion, is creating some cleavages which will be dealt with later in this presentation. Data from different international comparative projects that include all or many European countries support this statement, and show decreasing differences among European countries, to the point that, as is well known, in most cases intra-country differences are greater than inter-country differences. One could therefore conclude that there is a process of convergence on the cultural sub-system which is a consequence of greater exchanges among persons in the different European countries. Europeans also share common values regarding democracy, human rights, gender equality, new emancipatory values and many others, which definitely constitute a common non-material culture.

Greater interdependence has also influenced the social sub-system through growing similarities among social institutions, life styles and social structures. Demographic structures and processes are very similar for all 25 member states: low fertility, high life expectancy, very low population growth and aging populations. Educational systems are converging, even at the University level (i.e., Bologna process). Welfare systems are not only converging, but integrating with each other, especially with respect to medical care and retirement pensions. Isomorphism in social institutions, as in economic institutions, facilitates exchange and understanding of each other, and is again a result of increasing interaction that has created increasing interdependence.

The least developed convergence seems to rely on the political sub-system. The nation-state continues to be the main political actor. The new European political institutions are very little known by Europeans, but this is mainly due to the fact that political elites have done little to create a European identity and a European citizenship. It is true that the elimination of internal borders has also eliminated passports within the Schengen area, but European citizens continue to feel more attached to their country than to the new European institutions. Research has demonstrated, through the concept of “nested identities”, that there is no real conflict in feeling attached to the place where one lives, to the region, to the country, and to Europe, because these different identities are compatible. Nevertheless, few European citizens really would acknowledge being Europeans rather than nationals of their country. The country, the state, continues to be the frame of political reference for most Europeans, as is demonstrated through many indicators, electoral participation in European elections being one of the most salient. Voters cannot visualize European elections as part of their concerns, because what they see is their national candidates and political parties, and very seldom they have the choice among European issues instead of national issues in the parties’ electoral manifestos. The majoritarian (though not unanimous) consensus reached to have a common currency has not been followed by other more political aspects, like having a common fiscal policy, or common Armed Forces, or a common police system, etc. Inertia in the support to national political institutions prevails over support to European political institutions. If there must be a greater political convergence, political elites must take more seriously their role in creating affection and identification with political European institutions, and to achieve that goal the best way is to do it through education and through mass media. After 50 years, the European Union has achieved most of its goals concerning the economic market and sub-system, the cultural sub-system and even the social sub-system. But the normative sub-system continues to show great variations among European countries, the judicial and security sub-systems continue to be very different, although it must be recognized that more has been achieved in terms of military cooperation and the

establishment of common institutions that have grown of greater interaction and communication between the different national Armed Forces.

It is no novelty to say that attitudes and values spread more rapidly throughout society at large when elites incorporate the new values and attitudes. Research has shown that there are differences in values between elites and publics in European countries, and that the gap seems to be increasing rather than decreasing, so that the gap between political leaders and citizens is also increasing, and that is especially true with respect to knowledge, support and affection towards European institutions. Past experience regarding the approval of the so called "European Constitution" is a good example of this problem. Survey results show that political participation in national affairs is decreasing if one focuses on traditional modes of participation (voting in elections, membership in political parties and labor unions), just the same as traditional modes of religiosity seem to be decreasing. This might reflect some kind of rejection of established political elites and leaders, but not necessarily a lack of interest in political participation and religious practice, as the increase in new modes of political participation (through public demonstrations, signing petitions, membership in associations, voluntary work, etc.) and new modes of experiencing religiosity or spiritual life seem to demonstrate (research results show a decrease in religious practice but no significant change in religious beliefs).

2. Some New Obstacles to an EU citizenship

It seems in a sense paradoxical that when the member states of the European Union are working to build a closer and united Europe, some social processes seem to jeopardize it. Apart from the well known "euro-scepticism" based on the fear to lose national sovereignty, there has been a kind of counter process to the supra-national organization that the European Union implies which reinforces regional or sub-national identity, not necessarily nested with the national or the European identities, but too frequently trying to replace them. Not all regional or sub-national movements are necessarily contrary nor conflicting with national or European identification, but some of them are very much contrary and conflicting with them. There are also some regional or sub-national identities that try to overcome past grievances with national identity through increasing support to European identity. Once more, the reasons for different European countries to be more or less pro-European are very different, usually bound to their history.

Another supposed obstacle to European citizenship seems to be the quite recent and massive flow of immigrants from outside the European Union. It is true that recent immigration processes are very different from those experienced by the more developed countries in Europe during the decade of the '60s. At that time, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and other countries, received large numbers of immigrants, though not exclusively, from Southern European countries like Italy, Greece, Spain, the former Yugoslavia, Portugal, some of which were already members of the Common Market or the European Community, and others being on the waiting list for later admission. Differences between native receiving populations and foreign immigrant populations were based more on economic than on cultural aspects. Though not yet citizens of the European Union they were nevertheless Europeans.

New immigration flows show greater cultural, and not only economic, differences when compared with native receiving populations. Language is certainly not the most important difference, because immigrants soon learn the language of the receiving population in order to facilitate their finding a job and their social integration. EU-25 had a stock of 40 million immigrants in 2005, plus an additional one and a half million refugees. The countries with the largest stocks, more than one million immigrants, are Germany (over 10 million), France (6.5 million), United Kingdom (5.4 million), Spain (4.8 million), Italy (2.5 million), The Netherlands (1.6 million), Austria (1.2 million) and Sweden (1.1 million). But the relative weight of migrants over the national population of each EU-member country is also very different, the largest proportions (over 10% of total population) being Luxembourg (37.4%), Latvia (19.5%), Estonia (15.2%), Austria (15.1%), Ireland (14.1%), Cyprus (13.9%), Sweden (12.4%), Germany

(12.3%), Spain (11.1%), France (10.7%) and The Netherlands (10.1%). Finally, all countries in the EU have immigration policies for the integration of non-citizens with the only exception of Malta.

However, one should not be misled to think that European countries are the ones with the largest stocks of immigrants, nor with the largest proportions of immigrants relative to their population. In fact, among the 20 countries with the largest stock of immigrants there are only 4 EU-members (Germany, France, UK and Spain, occupying respectively ranks 3, 5, 9 and 10). And with respect to the relative weight on their population, among the 20 countries with the largest proportion of immigrants relative to their total population, only three are EU-members (Latvia, Estonia and Austria, and they are in ranks 10, 17 and 18 respectively).

There is also some wrong ideas about the degree of racism or xenophobia shown by Europeans towards their immigrants. Nothing could be more different from reality. Using data for about 100 countries from the World and European Values Surveys, based on the same questions, I have found that rejection of foreign workers, and rejection of persons of other nationalities, is highest among the less developed countries, while Anglo Saxon, European Protestants, European Catholics, and European Orthodox, rank among the least xenophobic or racist countries.

These findings, however, should not be an excuse for self indulgence. The European Union must face the challenge of integrating immigrants into their societies. Of course there are also differences among European Union countries regarding the degree to which they discriminate immigrants, Sweden and Spain being the countries that show less rejection and more integration of immigrants according to different international comparative projects such as the already mentioned WVS-EVS surveys on cultural values, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometers. Certainly these differences are not only a consequence of characteristics of nationals from different countries, but also a consequence of the countries of origin and the larger or smaller cultural differences, the time of permanence in the receiving country of the different stocks of immigrants, their degree of social integration, etc. Comparisons are then difficult to make, because one must take into account very different variables in each case. To give an example of what I know a little better, the case of Spain. Only recently there has been a real massive immigration, so that, until ten years ago the proportion of foreigners living in Spain came mainly from EU or European countries, and less than half came from third countries, some of them very developed countries. Even now the proportion is about 65% to 35% in favour of the non-EU countries. But more than half of the non-EU immigrants come from Latin American countries, who can integrate very easily because of the common language and the long-standing historical relationship between Spain and Latin America. Therefore, the proportion of foreigners whose social integration is a little more problematic is not higher than 30%, and that refers mainly to Moroccans and other Magreb countries, as well as Subsaharians more recently. Something similar could probably be said about East Europeans immigrants in Germany or other central European EU members.

This variety of situations demands some answers to some common questions that will be only enumerated here. First, who is a foreigner and who is an immigrant? In fact, all foreigners residents in a country are, by statistical and legal definition, immigrants, but people refer to immigrants only referring to some foreigners. In Spain, for example, an Argentinian would never be considered an immigrant, while an Ecuatorian most likely will be referred to as an immigrant. The question of who is an immigrant usually refers to socio-economic, and not to legal or national characteristics, nor even to racial characteristics. The second question refers to when does an immigrant stop being an immigrant, not in legal terms, but in social terms: when he/she is given the nationality of the receiving country?, after a certain number of years of legal residence?, what about second and third generation immigrants? This is actually one of the most pressing issues, because some countries are experiencing social conflicts with persons who have been born in the country, whose parents may have been immigrants or may have been born also in the country. So called second and third generation immigrants are not really immigrants, and

we should stop referring to them as immigrants, because that usually has social consequences. They are nationals, they are citizens, and referring to them as immigrants is a way of stigmatising them socially. This stigma refers more to members of a different race, or a different religion, or a different ethnic group, the only requirement being that the difference with the so called “natives” is visible. That is why, in a country like Spain, East European immigrants or Latin American immigrants have more facilities to integrate in society, nor to speak of EU nationals, of course.

I have left till the end the issue of religion on purpose, because it deserves a special treatment. There has been a great debate about how to deal with Muslim immigrants, their religious practices, their customs, and so on. First, one should consider that in all EU-member countries there is freedom of religion, and that many nationals, and not only immigrants, are Muslims. On the other hand, customs that are not illegal should be accepted, and immigrants should be expected to accept the normative system of the receiving country. Respect and tolerance on the part of the two parties is the basis of understanding and co-existence. Research findings show that nationals that have had a conversation with an immigrant tend to be less racist and exclusionist than those who have never had such a conversation. Research findings show that immigrants internalize the values of the receiving population in a shorter period of time than would be expected, and that religious and family values take more time to change than other economic and political values.

Finally, it must be underlined that another obstacle that was important some decades ago, the ideological divide, does not constitute cleavage any more. Different ideologies co-exist within the EU and not only they are not an obstacle to increasing integration, but they contribute to that integration by providing different perspectives on common problems, competing for the support of electorates.

3. Some provisional conclusions

The process of integration in the European Union has followed a predictable path, based on interdependence, an interdependence first with regard to resources, and that is why integration has been more complete regarding economic institutions, then regarding values and social institutions, but integration encounters more difficulties regarding political institutions, because that means a new distribution of power. Nevertheless, political integration has increased greatly over the last 50 years, but it requires that European citizens know and experience their European citizenship, something that political elites have not succeeded in conveying to their nationals.

One of the greatest challenges the EU has to face in the next few years is that of integrating immigrants from third countries. In this respect it seems evident that the demographic conditions in Europe require immigration for years to come, but immigrants are not going to solve all problems facing Europe. Those who believe that immigration will solve the problem of retirement pensions do not take into account the fact that immigrants also age, and having contributed to Social Security they will demand and be eligible to receive retirement pensions. And those who consider immigration a problem, especially those who fear that European identity will be lost have very little knowledge of history. Europe has been a “melting pot” much earlier than other countries in the world, a mixture of races, religious beliefs and languages, and there should be no fears as to the capacity of Europe to continue assimilating and integrating peoples coming from very different geographical and cultural origins. The question that must be answered is whether or not diversity or homogeneity provides more or less stability to the new interdependent community that the European Union represents. From other natural sciences it is well known that diversity contributes more to adaptation than homogeneity. A certain degree of both is probably the best mixture.

ANNEX

Some Tables from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Module on National Identity (2003) UE member countries only

Table 1

International organizations are taking away too much power from the [Country Nationality] government.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	5,7%	30,3	28,2	30,8	5,0	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	5,7%	30,3	28,6	31,7	3,7	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	16,6%	40,2	29,4	13,3	,5	100,0
Austria (AT)	17,5%	38,2	21,6	18,2	4,5	100,0
Hungary (HU)	11,7%	32,0	30,0	22,3	4,1	100,0
Ireland (IE)	8,4%	44,8	14,4	30,8	1,6	100,0
Sweden (SE)	8,1%	38,5	34,9	15,8	2,7	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	12,6%	34,4	33,6	16,9	2,5	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	8,2%	37,2	31,1	21,5	2,0	100,0
Poland (PL)	7,3%	33,9	35,2	22,1	1,6	100,0
Spain (ES)	5,2%	35,4	39,7	17,1	2,5	100,0
Latvia (LV)	6,5%	28,9	40,1	22,5	2,0	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	9,8%	35,8	36,9	15,7	1,8	100,0
France (FR)	17,7%	32,6	25,9	19,3	4,6	100,0
Portugal (PT)	14,3%	45,3	23,0	15,7	1,9	100,0
Denmark (DK)	23,9%	33,6	18,5	15,8	8,2	100,0
Finland (FI)	11,6%	33,8	32,1	21,4	1,1	100,0

Table 2

It is impossible for people who do not share [Country's] customs and traditions to become fully [Country's nationality]

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	18,9%	36,0	18,9	19,7	6,4	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	26,4%	38,3	13,9	18,2	3,2	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	16,5%	37,7	18,1	24,1	3,6	100,0
Austria (AT)	30,3%	29,8	13,9	16,4	9,6	100,0
Hungary (HU)	24,0%	36,9	21,5	13,9	3,7	100,0
Ireland (IE)	10,1%	42,3	9,0	35,1	3,5	100,0
Sweden (SE)	16,2%	34,5	25,0	16,9	7,4	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	20,3%	32,5	23,0	18,8	5,5	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	21,0%	31,7	17,3	25,9	4,1	100,0
Poland (PL)	12,0%	38,3	23,9	23,6	2,2	100,0
Spain (ES)	6,4%	46,2	24,8	19,0	3,6	100,0
Latvia (LV)	22,0%	40,3	20,5	14,7	2,4	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	12,0%	22,2	30,0	30,3	5,6	100,0
France (FR)	34,9%	25,2	15,4	13,9	10,6	100,0
Portugal (PT)	16,1%	43,2	13,8	21,9	5,0	100,0
Denmark (DK)	30,1%	31,3	8,0	16,9	13,9	100,0
Finland (FI)	23,7%	36,2	19,9	18,4	1,8	100,0

Table 3
Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	3,7%	26,5	28,4	28,4	12,9	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	5,0%	45,4	22,9	18,7	8,0	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	1,8%	15,7	27,3	41,4	13,7	100,0
Austria (AT)	8,9%	27,9	20,8	25,6	16,8	100,0
Hungary (HU)	23,9%	44,1	23,7	6,4	1,9	100,0
Ireland (IE)	4,0%	36,4	18,1	34,7	6,9	100,0
Sweden (SE)	3,9%	20,3	36,0	27,0	12,9	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	9,1%	27,8	31,9	18,7	12,5	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	19,5%	55,6	15,5	7,6	1,8	100,0
Poland (PL)	11,6%	61,6	20,4	5,7	,7	100,0
Spain (ES)	3,6%	37,6	36,9	18,1	3,8	100,0
Latvia (LV)	11,5%	43,3	24,2	15,3	5,6	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	8,9%	33,5	35,6	16,8	5,3	100,0
France (FR)	5,3%	14,4	23,9	28,3	28,1	100,0
Portugal (PT)	13,8%	47,0	23,2	12,9	3,1	100,0
Denmark (DK)	2,8%	12,1	10,2	21,0	53,7	100,0
Finland (FI)	8,5%	37,2	26,7	20,1	7,6	100,0

Table 4
Help minorities to preserve traditions

	Maintain traditions	Adapt into larger society	
Germany-West (DE-W)	35,8%	64,2	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	38,0%	62,0	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	24,7%	75,3	100,0
Austria (AT)	32,5%	67,5	100,0
Hungary (HU)	58,1%	41,9	100,0
Ireland (IE)	34,1%	65,9	100,0
Sweden (SE)	15,3%	84,7	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	40,5%	59,5	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	58,5%	41,5	100,0
Poland (PL)	70,7%	29,3	100,0
Spain (ES)	31,9%	68,1	100,0
Latvia (LV)	71,4%	28,6	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	62,0%	38,0	100,0
France (FR)	26,8%	73,2	100,0
Portugal (PT)	43,1%	56,9	100,0
Denmark (DK)	12,0%	88,0	100,0
Finland (FI)	38,1%	61,9	100,0

Table 5
Immigrants increase crime rates

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	17,3%	45,3	20,9	12,8	3,7	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	23,2%	44,3	18,2	11,8	2,5	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	13,5%	26,3	32,6	24,5	3,1	100,0
Austria (AT)	36,1%	32,7	13,6	11,0	6,6	100,0
Hungary (HU)	31,7%	35,9	20,3	10,0	2,1	100,0
Ireland (IE)	7,6%	30,7	18,3	38,0	5,3	100,0
Sweden (SE)	19,4%	37,8	24,7	12,5	5,7	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	36,3%	37,0	18,7	6,8	1,1	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	18,4%	35,3	19,8	22,2	4,2	100,0
Poland (PL)	12,4%	40,0	24,6	21,8	1,2	100,0
Spain (ES)	11,3%	46,3	18,7	18,4	5,2	100,0
Latvia (LV)	9,1%	26,1	26,7	33,7	4,4	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	16,5%	28,5	35,0	16,6	3,5	100,0
France (FR)	19,9%	23,7	20,5	18,0	18,0	100,0
Portugal (PT)	14,5%	45,0	14,0	22,5	4,0	100,0
Denmark (DK)	36,5%	36,1	11,3	10,3	5,7	100,0
Finland (FI)	16,7%	31,8	30,4	18,3	2,8	100,0

Table 6
Immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	1,4%	27,2	39,4	24,3	7,7	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	1,0%	21,0	33,7	32,3	12,0	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	1,2%	20,4	36,8	33,5	8,1	100,0
Austria (AT)	7,2%	31,0	29,2	23,3	9,3	100,0
Hungary (HU)	2,2%	10,3	37,7	35,4	14,4	100,0
Ireland (IE)	3,6%	36,0	21,2	35,0	4,2	100,0
Sweden (SE)	6,1%	38,2	35,5	13,3	7,0	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	3,2%	12,0	30,9	38,1	15,9	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	4,1%	27,0	34,1	30,0	4,8	100,0
Poland (PL)	1,9%	19,9	41,5	33,2	3,5	100,0
Spain (ES)	5,3%	43,9	34,3	14,5	2,1	100,0
Latvia (LV)	1,5%	18,2	36,2	37,8	6,3	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	,9%	7,9	39,8	42,4	9,0	100,0
France (FR)	7,1%	28,0	29,0	20,7	15,2	100,0
Portugal (PT)	10,4%	47,0	21,6	17,3	3,7	100,0
Denmark (DK)	8,3%	22,4	23,4	22,3	23,6	100,0
Finland (FI)	1,8%	19,0	33,6	32,8	12,8	100,0

Table 7
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in[Country]

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	11,9%	26,8	29,2	23,2	8,8	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	16,9%	41,2	18,1	19,0	4,8	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	12,1%	32,7	26,4	24,4	4,4	100,0
Austria (AT)	14,6%	25,4	22,9	22,6	14,6	100,0
Hungary (HU)	23,9%	32,2	25,5	15,5	2,9	100,0
Ireland (IE)	8,4%	36,1	12,5	39,2	3,7	100,0
Sweden (SE)	2,5%	5,3	27,2	43,8	21,3	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	24,5%	34,3	24,4	13,1	3,7	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	13,3%	34,7	21,7	26,1	4,2	100,0
Poland (PL)	14,3%	45,0	20,6	18,8	1,2	100,0
Spain (ES)	7,6%	33,0	19,0	32,5	8,0	100,0
Latvia (LV)	12,7%	35,9	23,8	24,9	2,7	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	12,2%	27,4	35,6	22,5	2,3	100,0
France (FR)	11,9%	13,7	20,8	25,2	28,3	100,0
Portugal (PT)	16,0%	39,4	12,3	27,4	5,0	100,0
Denmark (DK)	6,0%	9,8	17,6	26,4	40,1	100,0
Finland (FI)	9,0%	18,5	25,4	37,4	9,7	100,0

Table 8
Immigrants improve[Country Nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	7,1%	49,4	24,9	13,0	5,6	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	4,9%	45,4	25,9	17,1	6,8	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	3,7%	29,9	35,6	24,6	6,2	100,0
Austria (AT)	10,7%	35,8	24,0	20,2	9,2	100,0
Hungary (HU)	3,3%	21,2	34,5	31,1	10,0	100,0
Ireland (IE)	5,7%	51,4	15,4	23,3	4,1	100,0
Sweden (SE)	10,5%	48,1	27,0	9,6	4,9	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	2,6%	14,5	33,6	33,1	16,2	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	5,9%	38,6	28,0	24,0	3,6	100,0
Poland (PL)	2,6%	25,4	38,8	28,9	4,3	100,0
Spain (ES)	6,4%	53,5	27,4	11,4	1,3	100,0
Latvia (LV)	3,9%	28,0	35,1	25,6	7,3	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	2,3%	18,3	41,9	29,6	7,8	100,0
France (FR)	10,6%	30,7	24,7	18,4	15,6	100,0
Portugal (PT)	9,4%	43,7	24,4	18,6	3,8	100,0
Denmark (DK)	19,8%	40,1	16,9	10,6	12,6	100,0
Finland (FI)	7,1%	40,3	28,6	16,3	7,8	100,0

Table 9
Number of immigrants coming to country

	Increase a lot	Increase a little	Remain the same	Reduced a little	Reduced a lot	
Germany-West (DE-W)	,9%	4,5	24,3	26,5	43,8	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	1,0%	1,7	18,9	23,9	54,5	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	2,1%	3,7	16,4	24,1	53,7	100,0
Austria (AT)	1,0%	5,8	32,2	27,6	33,4	100,0
Hungary (HU)	,4%	1,8	28,9	32,4	36,5	100,0
Ireland (IE)	1,3%	7,9	32,1	30,3	28,5	100,0
Sweden (SE)	2,7%	9,2	30,3	29,9	27,9	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	,9%	3,4	24,6	31,4	39,7	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	,5%	2,6	45,7	33,6	17,6	100,0
Poland (PL)	2,3%	4,7	39,0	27,8	26,1	100,0
Spain (ES)	2,6%	7,2	38,7	37,4	14,1	100,0
Latvia (LV)	,6%	1,9	42,0	27,2	28,2	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	2,7%	9,3	33,0	20,5	34,5	100,0
France (FR)	2,7%	5,1	26,2	25,0	41,1	100,0
Portugal (PT)	,6%	2,5	40,7	36,4	19,8	100,0
Denmark (DK)	1,3%	8,5	38,8	23,4	28,0	100,0
Finland (FI)	3,5%	21,0	40,8	17,2	17,4	100,0

Table 10
Legal immigrants to[Country] who are not citizens should have the same rights as[Country Nationality] citizens.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Germany-West (DE-W)	8,6%	31,3	15,7	28,4	16,1	100,0
Germany-East (DE-E)	7,6%	40,0	16,5	22,9	13,0	100,0
Great Britain (GB)	5,5%	35,8	19,7	30,6	8,4	100,0
Austria (AT)	16,1%	27,9	13,6	25,1	17,2	100,0
Hungary (HU)	9,4%	20,7	28,6	28,0	13,1	100,0
Ireland (IE)	4,1%	51,3	12,0	26,3	6,2	100,0
Sweden (SE)	12,6%	29,1	25,6	23,6	9,1	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	15,2%	30,0	26,1	19,1	9,6	100,0
Slovenia (SI)	10,0%	27,8	17,3	36,8	8,1	100,0
Poland (PL)	7,6%	42,6	23,2	23,5	3,1	100,0
Spain (ES)	19,7%	54,5	17,9	7,3	,6	100,0
Latvia (LV)	13,0%	18,0	22,8	36,8	9,5	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	17,5%	36,6	26,1	14,1	5,7	100,0
France (FR)	18,8%	27,2	14,7	20,1	19,2	100,0
Portugal (PT)	33,3%	45,7	9,6	9,1	2,2	100,0
Denmark (DK)	22,2%	27,3	11,8	17,4	21,3	100,0
Finland (FI)	8,1%	28,9	22,6	30,9	9,4	100,0

Table 11
Heard-read about [European Union]

	Heard-read about [European Union]				Total
	A lot	Quite a bit	Not much	Nothing at all	
Austria (AT)	14,6%	48,0	34,9	2,5	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	8,2%	50,0	37,7	4,0	100,0
Poland (PL)	7,5%	46,7	41,5	4,3	100,0
Spain (ES)	9,5%	46,9	38,7	4,9	100,0
Latvia (LV)	15,8%	48,0	35,0	1,2	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	11,4%	46,6	37,9	4,1	100,0
France (FR)	43,2%	38,2	16,7	1,9	100,0
Finland (FI)	23,8%	59,5	15,2	1,5	100,0

Table 12
Benefits from being member of [European Union]: EU MEMBERS

	Benefits from being member of [European Union]: EU MEMBERS					Total
	Greatly benefits	Largely benefits	Somewhat benefits	Only a little	Not at all benefit	
Austria (AT)	49,1%	,0	,0	,0	50,9	100,0
Hungary (HU)	3,5%	31,3	33,7	18,8	12,8	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	4,7%	17,6	29,8	31,8	16,1	100,0
Poland (PL)	5,9%	30,8	36,4	19,3	7,6	100,0
Spain (ES)	8,9%	42,3	36,2	8,3	4,2	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	5,5%	19,8	44,6	24,6	5,6	100,0
France (FR)	15,5%	32,9	38,1	11,0	2,7	100,0
Portugal (PT)	10,4%	26,4	43,5	14,4	5,3	100,0
Finland (FI)	2,9%	15,3	47,7	25,1	9,0	100,0

Table 13
[Country] should follow [European Union] decisions, even if it does not agree with them.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
Austria (AT)	6,3%	20,6	23,7	31,9	17,5	100,0
Sweden (SE)	5,7%	34,0	30,7	21,2	8,5	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	4,8%	19,4	26,7	32,1	17,0	100,0
Poland (PL)	3,4%	21,7	27,5	40,7	6,7	100,0
Spain (ES)	5,3%	43,0	30,6	18,1	2,9	100,0
Latvia (LV)	4,4%	20,1	31,0	38,9	5,6	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	3,6%	15,2	34,0	33,5	13,7	100,0
France (FR)	11,3%	28,6	23,6	23,8	12,6	100,0
Finland (FI)	4,6%	26,8	25,6	34,1	8,8	100,0

Table 14

Generally, do you think that the [European Union] should have... Much more, more, as much, less, or much less power than the national governments of its member states?

	Much more	More	As much	Less	Much less	
Austria (AT)	1,1%	9,2	43,8	37,0	9,0	100,0
Hungary (HU)	4,8%	30,8	41,3	16,7	6,3	100,0
Sweden (SE)	1,8%	9,2	30,3	41,5	17,1	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	2,2%	13,6	50,9	24,0	9,4	100,0
Poland (PL)	5,1%	12,4	52,2	23,4	6,8	100,0
Spain (ES)	1,8%	22,0	62,3	11,1	2,8	100,0
Latvia (LV)	1,1%	15,0	49,1	23,9	10,8	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	2,6%	15,1	58,2	19,6	4,4	100,0
France (FR)	5,2%	15,5	44,1	24,5	10,6	100,0
Portugal (PT)	4,9%	28,7	50,0	14,7	1,6	100,0
Denmark (DK)	,9%	7,9	30,6	41,8	18,8	100,0
Finland (FI)	1,2%	6,7	27,0	51,0	14,1	100,0

Table 15

Generally, do you think that the [European Union] should have... Much more, more, as much, less, or much less power than the national governments of its member states?

	Vote in favour	Vote against	
Hungary (HU)	79,1%	20,9	100,0
Czech Republic (CZ)	69,2%	30,8	100,0
Latvia (LV)	64,5%	35,5	100,0
Slovak Republic (SK)	79,3%	20,7	100,0

Table 16

If there were a referendum today to decide whether[Country] does or does not become a member of the [European Union], would you vote in favor or would you vote against?

	Vote in favour	Vote against	
Austria (AT)	60,9%	39,1	100,0
Sweden (SE)	53,0%	47,0	100,0
Poland (PL)	82,0%	18,0	100,0
Spain (ES)	90,5%	9,5	100,0
France (FR)	78,5%	21,5	100,0
Finland (FI)	65,1%	34,9	100,0

**GLOBAL JEAN MONNET CONFERENCE
(ECSA-World Conference)**

“Europe's challenges in a globalised world”


Brussels, 23-24 November 2006

European Commission – DG EAC/Jean Monnet Action


**SESSION 2:
INTEGRATION OF PERSONS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND EU
CITIZENSHIP**


Juan Díez Nicolás
U. Complutense

EL ECOSISTEMA SOCIAL




ORGANIZACIÓN SOCIAL







Innovación en transportes




Mayor productividad

Medio ambiente ampliado.
Más recursos accesibles.

FUNCIONES DE LA COMUNIDAD

- Producción de recursos
- Distribución de recursos
- Reclutamiento de nuevos miembros
- Control y coordinación

LA UNION EUROPEA



EL MERCADO

- Transportes y comunicaciones reducen distancia
- Eliminación de fronteras interiores
- Moneda única
- Nueva división del trabajo
- Libre circulación de capitales, productos y personas

CULTURA Y VALORES

- Lengua
- Religión
- Valores comunes: democracia, derechos humanos, igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, valores de emancipación

INSTITUCIONES SOCIALES

- Familia
- Estilos de vida
- Estructuras demográficas
- Instituciones educativas
- Estado de bienestar

INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS

- Desconocimiento
- Elites y públicos
- Identidad europea y ciudadanía europea
- Identidades anidadas
- Elecciones europeas
- Instituciones europeas y ciudadanos
- Sistema normativo, tribunales de justicia, policía y Fuerzas Armadas
- Nuevas formas de participación política

NUEVOS OBSTACULOS A LA CIUDADANIA **EUROPEA**

- **Identificación con espacios sub-nacionales**
- **Renacimiento de los nacionalismos**
- **Inmigración**

LA INMIGRACION

- Stocks y proporciones
- Diferencias de integración de distintos grupos de inmigrantes
- Racismo y xenofobia: el desconocimiento del “otro”
- Extranjeros e inmigrantes
- Cuando se deja de ser inmigrante
- La socialización de los inmigrantes en la sociedad de acogida
- La inmigración islámica
- Los inmigrantes no son la solución a todos los problemas ni son el problema más importante



**MUCHAS GRACIAS
POR SU ATENCIÓN**