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DEVELOPING A PEACEFUL WORLD ORDER
AND EU SECURITY STRATEGY

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"Europe's challenges in a globalises world"
Session 3: Developing a peaceful world order and EU security strategy

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"Seeking security through superiority is to lead nations headlong into catastrophe, for superiority is limitless, and what is limitless cannot be achieved by man. It is no longer a question of preservation, rather of transformation, of establishing a new peaceful world order based on equality and from which the notion of superiority has been abolished".

Jean Monnet, 1962[2]

Introduction

Human actions are anchored in interpretations of the world. These interpretations are necessarily, if not explicitly, based on abstractions of some sort or another. The capacity of abstraction stands among the most distinctive characteristics of human beings –as a matter of fact, it has had a fundamental role in fostering the sciences, one of the great avenues of material progress for mankind.

Therefore, we deem it useful to begin this examination   by going quickly through the major traditions of analysis which have enriched European intellectual debate on security.

We will then turn our attention to history as a way of narrowing the gap between those theories and facts. In particular, we will try to single out how, and to what extent, European nation states have been addressing   the "twin philosophical concerns" which used to be "at the very heart of political thought" along centuries: the conditions for social order and the conditions for peace (Hoffmann, 1965, p. 22).

Contemporary international politics and security studies seem to have lost interest in such an encompassing vision, which seems worth deserving, in fact, careful analysis by a political actor like the European Union,   who is daring enough to step on the international arena as a new "global player" in a moment of daunting structural changes [3].

Where do we stand in terms of the history of ideas about security?

For the sake of clarity, we will reduce ideas about security to two main currents: the realist and the liberal (or idealist).

Liberal and realist views embody, first of all, a **different assumption**. Realists mainly consider states as caught up in a series of one-shot games, in a context that can be formalized, at the extreme, as a zero-sum game where participants "cannot all improve their positions because the

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sum of all players' power is a constant quantity". As summarized by Galtung (far from a realist himself), "the more power X has over Y, the less does Y have over X, the sum being constant" (Galtung, 1972, p. 33).

With this in mind, whenever a structural change takes place, players are easily transformed into enemies. As a matter of fact, as Wight reminded us in the Sixties, "security, on these premises, is necessarily exclusive, and your security is my insecurity" (Wight, 1966, p. 103).

In many real instances, however, as the liberals say, power is not a relative term, nor is it a given one. This is the case, for example, of economic power, in which the wealth of one, under some conditions, can contribute to the wealth of others (Keohane, 1984). Even in the extreme case of zero-sum games, where my gains are your losses, actors do not play just once for all. Indeed, relations in the international realm resemble more a repeated prisoner dilemma (or repeated Rousseau's hunt), where actors know that the game will be repeated an indefinite number of times; in this case, consensus on how to share losses and benefits seems to be the most rewarding option.

Modern scholars linked to the liberal tradition, therefore, concentrate their efforts on characterizing the best conditions under which cooperation can be reinforced. These are both "objective" conditions, such as technical challenges which can only be answered by a common response, and "voluntaristic" conditions, such as the creation of new norms, institutions and loyalties.

Additionally, liberals and realists focus on **different elements as the main objects of their analysis**. Realists concentrate on states and on how power is distributed among them in the international arena - and how calculations of comparative gains are reached. The *locus* of their analysis is the international system, intended as a group of self-contained states (Waltz, 1959, 1979). Among the various dynamics international relations are made up of, war is said to deserve most interest:
1. because it is the most destructive;
2. because it is always possible;
3. because coercive power is the most definite form of supremacy.

Security, then, is seen as intrinsically linked to the capacity to wage and win wars, to the quality and quantity of a state's strategic resources which make it able to win wars (whether arms, raw materials, technology or ideology) - *si vis pacem para bellum*.

Liberals (especially those from the Lockean tradition), on the other hand, focus on individuals as the fundamental unity of analysis and on the menaces to their lives, liberty and property as the most important factors affecting their security. The *locus* of their analysis is international society, intended as a *civitas maxima*, made up of individuals and groups.

If war is not the only "epiphany" of menaces, military force cannot always be considered the best way to cope with them all. Indeed, the juridification of the international space, intended in a broad sense as the creation of common norms, rules, institutions and loyalties, is seen as the most effective way to cope with all menaces and create a durable peace. Security is not simply embodied in the maxima *si vis pacem para justitia*, it is rather organized through a series of interlocking regimes, governing such disparate realities as the navigation on the Danube, the control of civilian air traffic, the procedures of nuclear disarmament, or the prosecution for breaches of human rights in the former Yugoslavia.

"Moral judgement" or "objective discovery"?

These traditions embody not only two different interpretations of what reality truly is, but also two different visions of what reality should be like.

Realism appears as a "status quo oriented discipline" (Guzzini, 2001). Change is seen as futile (any attempt at introducing changes is bound to be for the most part ineffective), perverse (any change creates instability and, therefore, a threat of war) and dangerous (any change is due to undermine what has been already achieved) (Hirschman, 1991).

More disturbingly, realism correspond to a "theory of survival". Not only does it not share any preoccupation for the "good life" (which, in Wight's vision, is the only recourse to eradicate war) (Wight, 1966), but it considers such a concern as a vicious moral bias to be gotten rid of in a systematic way.

As a matter of fact, referring to war as a crucial aspect of security can also be seen as "morally" biased –only, a morality of a different sort, as McSweeney puts it[4]. The *raison d'état* – on whose basis the calculation of comparative gains is carried out - can indeed be considered a "technology of power", aimed not so much at granting the security of citizens, but at reproducing and perpetuating the power of the state (Foucault, 2004).

Realism speaks for the most powerful among states and tries to reproduce, though rearmament, their superiority –a spiral of insecurity which has assumed a frightening nature during the atomic age. This is why Ruggie refers to it as being "reproductive" and not "transformative" (Ruggie, 285, 1986).

The liberal vision, based as it is on the Lockean tradition and on the French revolutionary legacies of *liberté, egalité, et fraternité*, has a "progressive" rationale which realists lack. It has a foresight of what "good life" should be and does not fear change, which it means to tame through the power of norms and institutions. International "juridification" is deemed to represent the best avenue to eradicate war. .

Rights, however, as Bobbio so clearly elucidated, did not turn up all at once: they have been developing over time, as a response (a reassurance) to the never ending challenges imposed on individuals and social classes by economic and technological developments. And rights alone do not exhaust the stuff "good life" is made of: more equal social and economic relations.

This is something neither one nor the other tradition seems to be overtly concerned about: realists simply leave it out of their analysis (for the sake of what they call "scientificity"), while liberals seems to overlook the struggles which dominate life and influence the construction of norms, for the sake of an "optimist" vision of life (Holsti,1985).

Both traditions, albeit for different (even opposed) reasons, by the way of abstraction, seem to get further from reality as opposed to closer to it.

A lesson of true realism from the history of Europe

European "classic" nation states consolidated around some crucial factors: technology, capital, coercion and territory (Tilly, 1992; Maier, 1996).

We can very roughly categorize them in three clusters of activities dealing with:
-the capacity to "view" its own territory and appreciate its strengths and weaknesses with the help of unified cadastres, census polls, national statistics, etc;
-the capacity to freeze a certain pattern of territoriality by building infrastructures, organizing networks of services, including transport and communication, setting up industries and towns around them;
-the capacity to extend control over its territory by means of bureaucracy, norms and means of coercion.

The ability to defend this territory - so carefully constructed and consolidated - from external attacks became a crucial function of the state. A special security system was set up, whereby the *raison d'état* of the state, the interests of its military industries and the sense of national identity became closely intermingled.

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[4] "It is a moral judgment, disguised as an objective or an axiom of common sense, which grounds the hierarchy of need on which state security rests in the primacy of the survival of the state" (McSweeney 1999).

In the course of this development, productive classes were offered representative channels in exchange for resources to build a more effective military apparatus, while (male) citizens were offered first class citizenship and a sense of common bonding by serving in the army.

The "security system" became a dense social fabric in which s**trong links were established between the legitimate monopoly of force by the state, the progressive democratization of its political arena, the industrialization process, and citizenship (in the double sense of rights and identity)**.

The Weberian idea of a (legitimate) monopoly of force by the state as its substantive character resulted, first and foremost, in an internal reinforcement (and legitimation) of the state as such, through its increased cohesiveness and stability.

But the monopoly of force did not grant security to European states and to their inhabitants from external attacks. On the contrary, the more power of destructiveness arsenals acquired through technological progress, the more insecure European citizens appeared to be. With the advent of the mass wars of the XXth century, war itself lost its value as the "continuation of politics by with other means" – it appeared, more properly, the suspension of any politics. This process would be accelerated by the nuclear race.

More disturbingly, yet, force, practical as it could be to enforce a hierarchy, was not sufficient to guarantee the sustainability of a certain order. This was the lesson of the interwar period: stability called for a consensus which was not there.

However, while states were artificially created and reshaped, a more substantive economic process, with roots in the end of the XIXth century, acquired force in the same period.

"In one direction" stated Carr in 1939 "there is a clearly marked trend towards integration and the formation of ever larger political and economic units. This trend set in during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and appears to have been closely connected with growth of large-scale capitalism and industrialism, as well as with the improvement of means of communication and of the technical instruments of power" (Carr, 1984,p. 229).

From our point of view, **this opened a new perspective on the appreciation of security: while territory is, by definition, a fixed quantity and, therefore, each game played around territorial questions is a zero-sum game, the market is, potentially, a win-win game, where everyone, under certain conditions, can find their own piece of prosperity (Keohane, 1984).** What is referred to nowadays as globalization could be seen as an amplification of such zero-sum game, although its consequences for the different nations and social groups involved keep being debatable.

Towards a pragmatic vision of international relations: equity versus force

This is the context in which the European Communities emerged and a true revolution in European security affairs prospered. Instead of following the consolidated, and vicious, patterns of balance of power, European elites accepted "a leap in the dark" (Schuman, 1950). France did not rearm, did not pursue the weakening of its dangerous neighbour, did not strike a deal with Great Britain against a possible resurgent Germany. To be sure, many attempts in this direction were made, but with no results.

The balance of power game shifted elsewhere, and the confrontation between the US and the USSR marked the fate of Europe. By no means should it be forgotten that the original price of the pacification of Western Europe was the partition of Europe itself. But the definitive reason of its forty years of peace didn't lie there, nor, as many initial versions of the Cold War suggested, on the Soviet menace, which was essentially built up for internal purposes[5].

The essential element, in our vision, was the search for equity as the best guarantee for a durable peace, pursued in the original phase of the integration process.

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[5] The real nature of the Soviet menace has been authoritatively discussed by Vladimir Zubok and the scholars attached to the "Cold War International History Project" of the Wilson Center (see www.wilsoncenterorg/cwhp).

In his celebrated book, Carr distinguishes between three kinds of equality:
-equality of the individual, which was the quest of the French revolution;
-equality of social groups, which was the quest of Marxism;
-and equality of nations, which was the quest of Wilsonian order (Carr, 1984, 226-227 –I ed. 1939)

The ideas of equality of individuals, equality of social groups and equality of nations all seemed to gather and coalesce in a single project of equity (the European Communities), taking place in a specific geographic area (Western Europe).

That was not by chance: the dangers of letting history proceed untamed, i.e. following its "natural fate" of struggles of power which are its fabric, were crystal clear for the generation of men and women who first conceived the European Communities: most of them had experienced two world wars of immense destructive power.

But European integration also drew heavily on previous achievements of European national states.Indeed, in the "division of labour" embodied by the European Communities, equality of individual and social groups was considered to be the responsibility of national governments, which offered extended rights to their citizens, coupled with social policies in a context of accelerated growth rate –partly linked to the rise in exports within the EC area. Equality of nations was the realm of the European Communities and their institutions.

Ever since, a win/win collective capitalistic game seems to have prevailed over the past zero-sum national territorial one. Some scholars, however, would surmise that this happened at the expense of underdeveloped countries . This is the true fabric of our "civilian power" – not an abstract call to multilateralism and juridification, but an attempt to extend the benefits of this game beyond our territorial borders.

Where does the EU stand?

The liberal tradition we have referred to in the opening seems to be embedded in the core legal texts of the EU, which put explicit emphasis on concepts such as liberty, the rule of law, human rights, democracy and social solidarity (Manners, 2002).

It also appears to be the background of the first *European Security Strategy* (2003), which clearly states that "Large-scale aggression against any Member States" is considered "improbable". This is indeed a courageous departure from a classic territorially-oriented vision of security.

Yet the text seems to refrain from recognizing what has been the core of European "internal" security for fifty years: the search for equity as a key to an enduring peace. Why not extend this search to the external world? And why shyly say that "security is a precondition of development"? This seems to be a vision of security still anchored to the concept of "defence" (from conflicts or threats of violence). The menaces highlighted in the paper are indeed of this sort: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.

The critical nature of these menaces cannot be denied and they must be confronted. But the point is: what is the "better world" the EU stands ready to actively build, while reacting to these short-term menaces?

The text clearly recognizes an explicit commitment "to upholding and developing international law", the objectives of the EU being "the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order". What is the European vision of how this ambitious objectives can be reached?

The response, I suggest, cannot be found but in an attempt to transform the world, by extending the notion of equity in social relations (of an internal and external character) to the world. This is the greatest legacy of the European integration experience –let's hope it can also be the most enduring one.

Buenos Aires, 18th November 2006

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